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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kyle Robert Lasch appeals from his judgment of conviction following his
conditional guilty plea to failure to register annually as a sex offender. Lasch challenges
the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on his assertion that he was not
required to register as a sex offender.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the initial facts leading to Lasch’s conviction for failing
to register annually as a sex offender as follows:
Kyle Robert Lasch (Lasch) was charged with Possession of Sexually
Exploitative Material, I.C. § 18-1507, 1507A, by Information on March 10,
2010, in Kootenai County Case CR-2010-3163. The Information
specifically accused Lasch of possessing material sexually exploiting a
child under the age of eighteen (18) years.
Based upon a plea agreement the charge was amended to Video
Voyeurism, I.C. § 18-6609, with a specific accusation of disseminating or
publishing images of the intimate areas of another person or persons. On
September 17, 2010, Lasch pled guilty to this amended charge; the parties
agree this was a so-called first offense video voyeurism. Lasch was placed
on probation with no obligation to register as a sex offender.
In 2010 a person had to be convicted of a second or subsequent
offense of Video Voyeurism before that person was obliged to register
under the Sex Offender Registration Act. I.C. § 18-8304(l )(a) was amended
in 2011 to provide for sex offender registration for a person convicted of
Video Voyeurism (regardless of first or subsequent offense) where the
victim is a minor.
In 2013, personnel with the Idaho Department of Corrections who
were involved in supervising Lasch advised him that he was required to
register with the sex offender registry. A member of the Kootenai County
Sheriff’s Department also informed Lasch that he was required to register
as a sex offender. Lasch complied with these directives.
(R., pp.118-119.)
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In 2016, the state charged Lasch in an Information with failing to register annually
as a sex offender. (R., pp.34-35.) Part II of the Information alleged that Lasch was a
persistent violator. (R., p.35.) Lasch, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging
that he did not violate the sex offender registration law, I.C. § 18-8304, “because he was
not convicted of a crime making him eligible to register as a sex offender in the first place.”
(R., pp.39-43.) After a hearing on Lasch’s motion to dismiss, the district court took the
matter under advisement. (2/13/17 Tr., p.17, L.21.) A few weeks later, the court held a
status conference in which it outlined three issues for the parties to submit simultaneous
briefing on. (3/15/17 Tr., p.41, L.20 – p.44, L.3.) After the parties complied with that
request (R., pp.60-70, 109-116), the court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (R., pp.118-125), which denied Lasch’s motion to dismiss.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lasch entered a conditional guilty plea to failure to
register annually as a sex offender, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss, and the persistent violator allegation was dismissed. (See
generally 6/22/17 Tr.) The court sentenced Lasch to a unified sentence of five years, with
zero years fixed. (R., pp.139-141.) Lasch filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.142-145.)
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ISSUE
Lasch states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lasch’s motion
to dismiss, because he was not under a duty to register as a sex offender?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Lasch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
Lasch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His
Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Lasch argues that I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a), which was amended in 2011 to make

persons convicted of “18-6609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor or upon a
second or subsequent conviction)” (emphasis added) subject to sex offender registration,
does not apply to him because he was not convicted of the crime of “video voyeurism
where the victim is a minor,” and the charging language of the Amended Information did
not allege that the victim was a minor. 1 (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-18.) Lasch’s argument
fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
Trial court orders on motions to dismiss are reviewed using an abuse of discretion

standard. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184, 45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002). “A lower court does
not abuse its discretion if the court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, acted
within the bounds of its discretion, and reached its decision by exercising reason.” State
v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600, 301 P.3d 242, 258 (2013) (citations omitted). “We
exercise free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of law.” State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015).

1

Lasch does not contest the fact that the victim of his 2010 crime of video voyeurism was
actually a minor. (See generally Appellant’s Brief.) The district court noted that, prior to
being amended, the Information “specifically accused Lasch of possessing material
sexually exploiting a child under the age of eighteen (18) years.” (R., p.118.) Moreover,
the police report states that the video file downloaded from Lasch’s computer displayed
“adolescent females from ages 13 to 5 years of age performing oral sex on adult males[.]”
(R., p.81.)
4

C.

I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) Unambiguously Required Lasch To Register Annually As A
Sex Offender If The Victim Of His Video Voyeurism Crime Was In Fact A Minor
Lasch argues that I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a), as amended in 2011, is unambiguous, and

because he was not convicted of the crime of “video voyeurism where the victim is a
minor,” and/or because the language of the video voyeurism charge in the Amended
Information did not allege the victim was a minor, he was not required to register annually
as a sex offender. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-15.) Lasch is correct in one respect – the
statute is unambiguous. However, as the state argued below, the statute is unambiguous in
the opposite way Lasch suggests. (See R., pp.62-66, 69 (“There is no ambiguity in the
language of I.C. § 18-8304[.]”).)
“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.” State v. Taylor,
160 Idaho 381, 385, 373 P.3d 699, 703 (2016).

“When the statute’s language is

unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not
need to go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory
construction.” State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 (2016). “Only where
the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and
consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.” In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho
345, 349, 326 P.3d 347, 351 (2014).
The relevant language of I.C. §18-8304 is as follows:
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who:
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime . . . in
section . . . 18-6609 (video voyeurism where the victim
is a minor or upon a second or subsequent conviction) .
...
I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) (emphasis added). The portion of this language in dispute is “where
the victim is a minor.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-15.)
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There is no reasonable reading of the registration statute’s plain language which
requires, before its provisions apply, that a person be convicted of a crime actually entitled
“video voyeurism where the victim is a minor” – because there is no such named crime. 2
See I.C. § 18-6609. Second, I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) lists the crimes that require sex offender
registration by citing their Idaho Code title/chapter/section numbers, followed by
parenthetical statements for each crime. The video voyeurism statute, I.C. § 18-6609, is
listed in the 2011 amended registration statute, followed by the parenthetical statement,
“(video voyeurism where the victim is a minor . . .).” “Video voyeurism” plainly alludes
to the “crime” set forth in the preceding citation to I.C. § 18-6609; therefore, the words that
follow, “where the victim is a minor,” do not describe or name any specific crime, and it
would have been impossible for Lasch to have been convicted of such a non-crime. To the
extent Lasch contends that he cannot be required to register annually as a sex offender
because he did not plead guilty in 2010 to a crime literally named “video voyeurism where
the victim is a minor,” his argument is not persuasive.
Next, I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) gives no hint that the charging language in the predicate
crime (i.e., the 2010 Amended Information) must have specifically alleged that the video
voyeurism was committed “where the victim is a minor.” The Idaho legislature could have
chosen to limit the sex offender registration requirement to those convicted of video
voyeurism where the charging document specified that the victim is a minor, but it did not
do so. Instead, the legislature chose to use the unrestricted phrase – “where the victim is a

2

It is not clear to the state that Lasch is actually making such a literal argument, but to the
extent he is, his argument is incorrect. (See Appellant’s Brief, p.14 (“Section 18-8304(1)
provides that a person must register as a sex offender if they have been ‘convicted’ of the
crime of ‘video voyeurism where the victim is a minor’ . . . .”).)
6

minor” – which is clear on its face. The only reasonable understanding of I.C. § 188304(1)(a)’s inclusion of “18-6609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor . . . .)” is
that, where the victim is in fact a minor, the person convicted of video voyeurism must
register as a sex offender. The statute says nothing about how the victim’s “minor” status
is to be determined. To read a requirement that the language charging video voyeurism
must allege that the victim is a minor is to re-draft the statute with words that are not
present.
In short, I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) is unambiguous, and only requires that the victim be,
in fact, a minor. The district court’s denial of Lasch’s motion to dismiss should be affirmed
on this ground which was presented by the state below. When the statute’s language is
unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not
need to go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory
construction.” State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 (2016).

D.

Even If I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) Is Deemed Ambiguous, The District Court Correctly
Held That It Required Lasch To Register Annually As A Sex Offender If The
Victim Of His Video Voyeurism Was In Fact A Minor
Where the words of the statute are ambiguous because they are subject to more than

one meaning, the Court examines “not only the literal words of the statute, but also the
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its
legislative history.” Taylor, 160 Idaho at 385, 373 P.3d at 703 (internal quotation omitted).
“Where ambiguity exists as to the elements or potential sanctions of a crime, this Court
will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant.” State v. Rhode, 133
Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). However, the ambiguity must be “grievous”
and “not resolved by looking at the text, context, history or policy of the statute” before the
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interpretation benefiting the defendant must be chosen. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437,
440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265
P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct. App. 2011)).
The district court first determined that the amended version of I.C. § 18-8304(1)
was ambiguous. (R., pp.122-124.) However, after considering “the literal words of the
statute,” “the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the
statute, and its legislative history[,]” the court concluded that it nonetheless required Lasch
to register as a sex offender if the victim of his video voyeurism was a minor. (Id.) The
court explained:
In enacting the amendment to I.C. § 18-8304(1), the legislature could easily
have said that a violation of 18-6609 (where the victim named in the
charging document is a minor) causes one to have to register as a sex
offender. They did not do so, but instead gave the more expansive
qualifying phrase, “where the victim is a minor.” It is also of note that the
legislative change clearly is intended to provide for greater public
accountability and protection by expanding the sex offender registration
duty to one who commits video voyeurism involving minors.[3]
3

The district court’s conclusion that the legislative intent favored an expansive view of
I.C. § 18-8304(1) is supported by the legislature’s findings prefacing the Sex Offender
Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act, I.C. § 18-8302, to wit:
FINDINGS. The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and
that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities,
conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sexual
offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available about
individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live within
their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing public access
to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists parents in
the protection of their children. Such access further provides a means for
organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable populations to
prevent sexual offenders from threatening those served by the
organizations. Finally, public access assists the community in being
observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from
recommitting sexual crimes. Therefore, this state’s policy is to assist efforts
of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring
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Based on the above analysis, this Court determines that the
legislature intended the statute in question to mean the commission of video
voyeurism that generally involves a child. There can be no other reasonable
conclusion in the instant case other than Lasch’s conviction for video
voyeurism was a case where the victim(s) were minors. Thus, Lasch is
obligated to register as a sex offender per the 2011 amendment to I.C. § 188304(1).
(R., p.123.)
Any ambiguity in the language of I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a) comes nowhere close to
being grievous. As the district court essentially held, the text, context, history and policy
of the statute resolve any ambiguity in the statute. See Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 440, 313
P.3d at 768 (citing Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 265 P.3d at 1159). Lasch has failed to
demonstrate any abuse of the court’s discretion in its denial of his motion to dismiss.

E.

Lasch’s Discussion Of The Bureau’s Methodology Is Irrelevant
Lasch challenges his classification as a person required to register as a sex offender,

contending, as he did below, that the Idaho State Police’s Bureau of Criminal Investigation
(“Bureau”) improperly “look[ed] beyond the registration form or charging document to
determine whether a person with an in-state conviction has to register as a sex offender.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.15; see generally id., pp.15-18.) However, Lasch apparently bypassed his initial opportunity to challenge the methodology the Bureau uses to make that
assessment, and he has cited no authority that would have permitted the district court, or
this Court on appeal, to second guess the Bureau’s determination.

sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to
make certain information about sexual offenders available to the public as
provided in this chapter.
9

The Bureau’s agency action of placing Lasch on the sex offender registry serves as
the basis for Lasch’s appellate challenge. However, Lasch could have challenged that
agency action through the appellate procedure for challenging sex offender registration
determinations made by the Bureau. See IDAPA 11.10.03.012.08.g (“Judicial review of
the bureau’s determination shall be made in accordance with Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho
Code.”).
Moreover, the Bureau’s determination does not relieve the state of its burden, in
the criminal case, to prove Lasch’s duty to register. Regardless of how, or by whom, the
decision to place a person on the sex offender registry is made, once the state charges a
person with failing to register annually, it becomes the jury’s task to determine whether:
3. the defendant failed to register
4. with the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resided or was
temporarily domiciled
5. within ten (10) days after the Idaho State Police mailed a notice of annual
registration to the defendant at [his] last reported address, and
6. the defendant was at that time required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration Act.
ICJI 985A (emphasis added); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704
n.2 (2010) (“The I.C.J.I. are presumptively correct. Trial courts should follow the I.C.J.I.
as closely as possible to avoid creating unnecessary grounds for appeal.”); see I.C. § 192131 (The jury decides questions of fact in criminal trials).
Apart from the purely legal question presented here – whether I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a)
requires either the actual named offense or the language of the charging document to allege
that the victim of video voyeurism was a minor – it is a question for a jury to determine if
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a person was required to register as a sex offender, and left to the state to choose how to
prove that element of the crime at trial.
To establish that Lasch “was at that time required to register” (ICJI 985A), the state
would be required, at trial, to prove Lasch was convicted of video voyeurism under I.C.
§ 18-6609 and that the victim was a minor, I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a). Lasch has never claimed
the state could not meet that burden. He has therefore failed to show error in the denial of
his motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s denial of
Lasch’s motion to dismiss and his judgment of conviction.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2018.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of September, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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